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INFANT BRAIN DEATH: SOME COMMENTS
T.S. ELLIS, III*

Brain death' is a thoroughly modern concept. 2 Not until
the 1960's did it come into common parlance. It was the
child of advances in resuscitative techniques, including chiefly
the development of mechanical respirators and various therapies to restart and regulate heartbeat and maintain blood
pressure. By the 1960's, medical science had achieved the remarkable ability to maintain the respiration and heartbeat of
a patient who in the past would have been thought dead.
Such a patient had irreversibly lost any ability to breathe
without mechanical or artificial assistance. Moreover, this patient would never awaken, react to any stimuli, or recover
any cognitive or cortical function. The question then naturally arose-is such a patient alive or living?
This question was not only vexing, it was urgent. Signifi* BSE Princeton University, J.D. Harvard University, Dip. L. Oxford University. Member, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia.
1. "Brain death" as used here is the irreversible state of total absence of brain function, both cortex and stem. In this state, there is no
spontaneous respiration and absent a mechanical respirator, breathing
would cease, as would heart function soon thereafter. The term "brain
death," then, is to be sharply distinguished from "cerebral death," with
which it is often confused. Cerebral death connotes the state, sometimes
reversible, of persistent coma, absence of cortex function, but with some
remaining brainstem function, including respiration. See In re Quinlan, 70
NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976). For a judicial statement of the brain death-cerebral death distinction, see In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
2. Until modern times, determination of death has been based
chiefly on the absence of heart and respiratory function. Reliance on the
absence of breathing or heartbeat as a sign of death was sometimes unreliable with the result that history records a number of apparently spontaneous resurrections. Even as late as the last two decades, press accounts can
be found of persons prematurely declared dead on a cardio-pulmonary basis awakening or reviving. See A.E. WALKER, CEREBRAL DEATH 168-69
(1981). In the nineteenth century, the cardio-pulmonary standard for determination of death was thought by some to be sufficiently unreliable so
that they requested that they be wounded or mutilated before burial to
ensure that they were dead. Some persons were buried in coffins outfitted
with devices designed to ring a bell above earth in the event of any movement of the corpse's chest. These bizarre precautions do not seem so outlandish in light of the many accounts of live burials that appeared in the
literature in the nineteenth century. Id. at 6-7.
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cant pressures mounted for an answer, including an awareness that maintaining patients in this state often served to increase the anguish suffered by family and loved ones and
involved the expenditure of enormous resources, both public
and private. Moreover, uncertainty over the legal status of
such patients was a major obstacle to transplantation
medicine.$ All of this led in 1968 to the publication of certain
criteria by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death." These criteria, simply stated, held that a patient with a permanently
nonfunctioning brain, stem and cortex, was dead, not just
brain dead, but simply dead. The problem was to define this
state. According to the Harvard group, a patient with no
spontaneous respiration or elicitable reflexes, who is deeply
comatose with total unawareness of external stimuli and who
has an isoelectric (flat) electroencephalogram, was dead.5
The publication of the Harvard criteria was a major impetus for further debate,' and ultimately, for legislative action. In the 1970's, many states amended their statutory definitions of death to include, in some fashion, the brain death
concept. 7 Most states now have statutory definitions of death
3. See Wasmuth, The Medical, Legal & Ethical Considerations of
Human Organ Transplantations, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 636 (1970); Comment, The Criteria For Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants - A
Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REV. 220 (1973). For a vivid illustration of
the impact of the doubt then existing concerning the legal status of brain
death, see Tucker's Adm'r v. Lower, No. 2831 (Circuit Court for the City
of Richmond, Va. 1972). There, transplant surgeons removed the heart
and kidneys from an adult patient who, by today's brain death criteria, was
legally dead. In the absence of family members, consent for the organ removal was obtained from an assistant medical examiner. The decedent's
estate sued the surgeons for wrongful death and, in the absence of a statutory or legally established definition of brain death, the judge felt compelled to submit the case to the jury which, after about an hour's deliberation, returned a verdict in defendants' favor.
4. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine
the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A.
337 (1968).
5. The report recognized that the validity of these criteria as an indication of irreversible brain death depended upon excluding hypothermia
and drugs as causes of the coma. Id. at 338.
6. See Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standardsfor Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87
(1972).
7. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1984); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-202 to -203 (1985); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (1982). See also
Compton, Telling the Time of Human Death By Statute: An Essential and Progressive Trend, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 521 (1974).
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that include brain death' and the concept of such legislation
has been widely endorsed.' A recent major event in the de8. For a list of states with statutory definitions of brain death, see
A.E. WALKER, supra note 2, at 154-55. Typical statutes provide alternative
definitions of death, one based on cardiopulmonary criteria and the other
on brain death. See statutes cited supra note 7. This dual definition has
been criticized by commentators on the ground that inconsistencies are
possible. For example, the time of death might differ depending upon
whether cardiac or brain criteria are used or conceivably it might lead to a
misunderstanding that a person could be dead for one purpose, such as
transplantation, but alive for other purposes if alternative definitions exist.
See Capron & Kass, supra note 6.
9. See Uniform Brain Death Act, 12 U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1985); Uniform
Determination of Death Act, 12 U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 1985). See also Sackett, Jr.,
Euthanasia: Why No Legislation, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 3 (1975); Abram, The
Need For Uniform Law on the Determination of Death, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
1187 (1982); Beresford, Book Review, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1273 (1982)
(reviewing THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH (1981)). Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the brain death con-

cept has created new problems of its own. In the criminal context, some
defendants have argued, unsuccessfully as it happens, that they should be
absolved from liability for homicide where surgeons remove organs from
brain dead victims and thereafter disconnect life support systems. See People v. Bonilla, 95 A.D.2d 396, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1983). See also State v.
Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979) (first degree murder conviction
upheld notwithstanding defendant's contention that termination of life
support systems after brain death was the cause of death rather than gunshot wounds); People v. Mitchell, 132 Cal. App. 3d, 183 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1982); Swafford v. State, __ Ind. -,
421 N.E.2d 596 (1981); People v.
Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 472 N.E.2d 286, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984) (defendant not relieved of criminal liability for homicide by virtue of removal of
victim's vital organs after brain death declaration, notwithstanding that victim's heartbeat and breathing were artificially maintained after brain death
declaration). Given the ability to maintain the heartbeat and breathing of
some brain dead homicide victims, one wonders whether a prosecution for
homicide could proceed while the brain dead victim is'still on life support
systems.
The concept of brain death has also generated debate in various civil
contexts. Dority v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 273, 193 Cal. Rptr.
288 (1983) (court decided guardian could order removal of life support
systems from brain dead infant in case where. parents accused of child
abuse apparently opposed life support system removal in order to escape
liability for homicide); Janus v. Tarasewicz, 135 Ii. App. 3d 936, 482
N.E.2d 418 (1985) (brain death concept used in connection with question
as to which of two Tylenol poisoning victims died first for purposes of insurance policy survivorship clause); In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617
P.2d 731 (1980) (court affirmed application of brain death criteria to fiveyear-old, stating that patient was dead notwithstanding artificial maintenance of heartbeat and respiration after brain death); In re Haymer, 115
Ill. App. 3d 349, 450 N.E.2d 940 (1983) (court held seven-month-old patient on mechanical ventilation was brain dead and hence legally dead as of
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velopment of the brain death concept occurred in 1981 when
the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behaviorial Research endorsed the concept and outlined specific, now widely accepted criteria.10
Given that brain death is now widely accepted as a way
to
define death, what then is the problem in this context with
infants? Put simply, the concept of brain death, and specifically its definitional criteria, were developed from, and based
chiefly on, data and knowledge about adults and others, not
infants. There is, as it happens, a substantial body of data and
knowledge concerning brain death in adults and children
over five years of age." By contrast, infant brain physiology
is less well understood and there is, understandably perhaps,
less data available. 2 A substantial body of medical opinion
holds that infant brains may be more resilient, more resistant
to insults leading to an irreversible cessation of brain activity. 13 Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that some infants who exhibit the adult brain death criteria may not be in
an irreversible state. 4 In one reported instance, a neonate
that time and not as of the subsequent date on which somatic death occurred after removal of the ventilator).
10. Guidelinesfor the Determination of Death, 246 J.A.M.A. 2184 (1981)
(Report of the Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research).
11. See, e.g., A. E. WALKER, CEREBRAL DEATH (1981); Black, Brain
Death (pts. 1 & 2), 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 338, 393 (1978).
12. See, e.g., Holzman, Curless, Sfakiankis, Ajmonemarsan & Montes,
Radionuclide CerebralProfusion Scintigraphy in Determinationof Brain Death in
Children, 33 NEUROLOGY 1027 (1983); Rowland, Donnelly, Jackson & Jamroz, Brain Death in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit, 137 AM. J. DISEASE
CHILDHOOD 547 (1983). This point has also received judicial recognition.
See Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979)
(court affirmed removal of life support devices from brain dead 17-monthold abuse victim; doctors testified that clinical and laboratory criteria for
pediatric brain death diagnosis are less certain).
13. See, e.g., Dear & Godfrey, Neonatal Auditory Brainstem Response
Cannot Reliably Diagnose Brainstem Death, 60 ARCH. DISEASE CHILDHOOD 17
(1985); Goldowsky, Uniform Determination of Death, 66 R.I. MED. J. 309, 311
(1983); McMenamin & Volpe, Doppler Ultrasonagraphy in the Determination
of Neonatal Brain Death, 14 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 302 (1983); Rowland, Donnelly, Jackson & Jamroz, Letter, 138 AM. J. DISEASE CHILDHOOD 102 (1984).
See also Schwartz, Baxter & Brill, Diagnosis of Brain Death in Children by
Radionuclide Cerebral Imaging, 73 PEDIATRICS 14 (1984).
14. Jugullon and Reilly, Development of EEG Activity After Ten Days of
Electrocerebral Inactivity: A
Case Report in a Premature Neonate-Hydranencephaly or Massive Ventricular Enlargement, 13 CLINICAL
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awakened and recovered after exhibiting electrocerebral silence and other signs typically thought to establish brain
death in adults. 5 For all these reasons, the 1981 President's
Commission recommended that "Physicians should be particularly cautious in applying neurologic criteria to determine
death in children younger than five years. ' 16
Mindful of the doubt concerning the applicability of
adult brain death criteria to small children, especially infants
and neonates, the Child Neurology Society 17 has laudably undertaken to study this issue with an eye toward publishing criteria specific to small children, infants and neonates. A draft
of brain death criteria for children entitled "Task Force on
Brain Death in Children" [Task Force] has recently been circulated by a Committee of the Society and it is the purpose of
this article to make some general observations on this important effort."8 First, a brief description is appropriate.
The introductory section of the Task Force begins by
noting that the concept of brain death is well-established and
accepted legally and morally. It makes clear that brain death
as used in the document means not reversible cerebral death,
but an irreversible loss of all brain function from which "somatic death will invariably follow despite all medical
efforts."' 9
Importantly, the Task Force introduction affirms the validity of the brain death concept as applied to children.
Equally importantly, it then goes on to acknowledge that
adult brain death criteria may not be adequate for some children. Additional, pediatrically-oriented testing may be necessary. In the words of the Task Force introduction,
[Birain death as a medical event is a valid concept in chilELECTROENCEPHALAGRAP-Y

223 (1982); Pasternak & Volpe, Full Recovery

From Prolonged Brainstem Failure Following IntraventricularHemorrhage, 95
J. PEDIATRICS 1046 (1979).
15. See Ashwal, Smith, Torres, Loken & Chou, Radionucleotide Bolus
Angiography: A Technique for Verification of Brain Death in Infants and Children, 91 J. PEDIATRICS 722 (1977).
16. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behaviorial Research, 246 J.A.M.A. 2184, 2186 (1981).
17. The Society's membership consists of board-certified child
neurologists.
18. Task Force on Brain Death in Children (Nov. 26, 1985) (unpublished draft) [hereinafter cited as Task Force]. A copy of the Task Force
draft is on file in the offices of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and
Public Policy. It is important to note that the draft is preliminary in nature
and in the process of review and revision.
19. Id.at 1.
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dren of all ages. The physical (neurological) examination
criteria of brain death are identical in children and adult
patients. These examination criteria are necessary, but not
sufficient, in confirming brain death in children. Laboratory
testing is necessary and requires a specific pediatric
orientation. °
It is the proper selection and interpretation of additional
tests that are the principal focus of the Task Force draft.
This is no easy task, given that "most laboratory tests have
limitations in younger patients."2 1 Chief among the tests with
limitations in children is the electroencephalogram, 2 2 but it is
by no means the only test so limited.23 Understandably,
therefore, the major effort of Task Force members is directed to investigating which tests can and should be used to
eliminate ambiguity in determining brain death in pediatric

patients.
The brain death criteria
are as follows:

4

proposed by the Task Force

1. Absence, at the time of assessment, of hypothermia, hypotension, and drugs, toxins and/or metabolic derangements capable of simulating brain death.
2. Coma. Complete loss of consciousness, vocalization or
volitional activity.
3. Flaccid tone and absence of spontaneous or induced
movements, excluding spinal cord events such as reflex
withdrawal or myoclonus.
4. No cerebral function as defined by ancillary testing.
5. No brainstem function as defined by:
a. Midposition or fully dilated pupils which do not respond to light.
b. Absence of eye movements, including
oculocephalic and vestibular movements induced
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Ashwal & Schneider, Failure of Electroencephalographyto Diagnose Brain Death in Comatose Children, 60 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 512 (1979);
Green and Lauber, Recovery of Young Children After ECS, 35 J. NEUROLOGY,
103 (1972).
23. Id.; see also Dear & Godfrey, Neonatal Auditory Brainstem Response
Cannot Reliably Diagnose Brainstem Death, 60 ARCH. DISEASE CHILDHOOD 17
NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY

(1985).
24.

As in the case of the Harvard criteria, the reliability of the crite-

ria as indications of brain death depends upon excluding hypothermia and
drugs as causes of the coma. See Task Force, supra note 18, at 2.
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by head turning or caloric stimulation.
Absence of movement of bulbar musculature including facial and oropharynegeal muscles. The
corneal, sucking, and rooting reflexes are absent.
d. Absence of respiratory movements.
e. Ancillary testing must not refute the absence of
brainstem function.
c.

It is in the "ancillary testing," items 4 and 5e, that the
pediatric brain death criteria differs from that applicable to
adults. And it is with this ancillary testing-the applicability
to children and the need for special interpretation-that the
remaining pages of the Task Force are chiefly concerned. Finally, it is important to note that the current (November 26,
1985) draft specifies that the criteria should be met for a 24hour period for patients over one year old (including, presumably, adults) and for a full 48 hours for infants between
six and twelve months old.'5 Significantly, the Task Force
notes that insufficient data exists to document the reliability
of the criteria for infants younger than six months.'0 With
this summary description of the Task Force draft, we turn
next to some specific observations.
MORAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Task Force draft claims moral neutrality for its criteria. It states that "[B]rain death is a medical event definable
by scientific criteria independent of moral and ethical considerations."1
'1 On one view, this is nothing more than a definitional
statement, as innocuous as it is obvious. On this view, brain
death, like pneumonia or whooping cough, is a medical condition that exists or not-whatever one's moral views.
A second view is broader in focus; it sees, in terms of
consequences to a patient, a sharp distinction between definitions of pneumonia and those of brain death. On this view,
therefore, far from being independent of moral and ethical
considerations, the Task Force brain death definition is manifestly driven by a clear moral premise. That premise, simply
put, is that it is right to declare as dead those persons who
lose total brain function, cortex and stem, because, on the
basis of current knowledge, such a state is always irreversible
and invariably followed by somatic death notwithstanding ex25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 2

traordinary medical efforts.
The underlying moral view here is that dying is a process
and that brain death, as currently defined, is a point where
the process has become irreversible no matter what life support efforts are invoked. It is the irreversibility of the condition and dying process and the inevitability of somatic death
that are the moral and ethical hallmarks of the brain death
definition. The second view concedes that the Task Force
draft is correct in asserting that brain death is an event "definable by scientific criteria." 2' 8 But according to this view, the
definition of the event and the selection of the appropriate
scientific criteria must be (and are) based on a moral choice,
namely that the irreversibility of brain death as defined and
the inevitability (fairly imminently) of somatic death justify
declaring a person with this condition as dead for any purpose, including termination of all medical support efforts and
use of organs for transplants. Indeed, on this moral view, recognition of brain death as death for all purposes may be a
positive duty, an obligation. Continuation of extraordinary
medical efforts on a brain dead person is seen, on this view,
as prolonging death, not life, thereby causing unnecessary
anguish to family and loved ones, wasting scarce medical resources and potentially jeopardizing organ transplant
viability.2 9
The important aspect of the Task Force's moral premise
is its exclusion of quality of life considerations. This is as
surely correct as it is consistent with current law. 30 Decisions
concerning whether death has occurred should never turn on
anyone's assessment or opinion of the quality or value of future life likely to be experienced by the patient.3 "
28. Id.
29. Perfusion of some organs may be impaired by long-term respirator maintenance. Note, however, that there may be circumstances where
life support systems should be retained even after brain death occurs. This
might be true, for example, with a patient in the late stages of pregnancy
so that the fetus can survive to viability. See A.E. WALKER, supra note 2, at
184-85.
30. Current decisional law correctly equates total brain death with
death and recognizes that this state is distinguishable from comas and persistent vegetative states. The latter state is life, not death, for only a portion of the brain is dead; some brain function remains. And this is true no
matter how bleak the prospects or how miserable the future quality of life
may be. See, e.g., In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
31. In certain circumstances, however, the law grants competent, live
patients or their legal guardians or representatives the right to refuse fur-
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In sum, the moral basis of the Task Force criteria seems
both clear and clearly correct. To see the criteria, as the
Task Force draft does, as "independent of moral and ethical
considerations" may be too narrow a focus for some because
it fails to see that appropriate scientific criteria can only be
selected by reference to moral criteria. For adherents of this
view, the moral questions are (i) at what point in the dying
process is it acceptable to cease life-sustaining efforts, and (ii)
what degree of certainty is acceptable in determining
whether this point has been reached? In any event, it is
doubtful whether the purpose of the Task Force is served by
language which invites debate over whether the brain death
definition and criteria are morally neutral. Thus, elimination
from the statement that the brain death definition is independent of moral considerations would improve the draft. Worth
noting here, though, is that the Task Force's brain death definition and criteria derive from sound moral and settled legal
bases.
PHYSICIANS

As LAWMAKERS

The importance of the Task Force effort should not be
underestimated. It is, in effect, a lawmaking effort. Brain
death statutes, as they exist in most states, confer on physicians the power to prescribe how brain death is to be determined. Let me explain. Brain death statutes typically make
no distinction between infants and adults; the standard-"irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain"8 2-applies equally to both groups. The brain death
ther extraordinary care to sustain a life lacking in quality. This right is
typically grounded in the constitutional right to privacy. See In re Barry,
445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (parents granted right to authorize removal of 10-month-old infant's life support systems where the child
was in permanent vegetative state with more than 90% brain function permanently lost and life expectancy in this state of no more than two years);
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (respirator removal authorized as desired by competent,
terminally ill, 73-year-old man); In re LHR, 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716
(1984) (parents or legal guardians permitted to order removal of life support systems from terminally ill infant in chronic vegetative state with no
hope of recovering cognitive function); Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (authorization to withhold chemotherapy from incompetent, profoundly retarded, terminally ill
67-year-old man); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (.1976).
32. Uniform Determination of Death Act, 12 U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 1985).
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determination for both infants and adults must be made, according to most stautes, "in accordance with accepted medical standards""3 or on the basis of "the ordinary standards of
medical practice.""' What differs then with respect to adults
and infants is not the standard, but precisely how it is determined whether the standard is met. And this is ascertained by
reference to accepted medical standards. Such standards
would presumably include the Task Force criteria when ultimately published. Thus, the final results of the Task Force
effort are likely to be the statutory standard for pediatric
brain death determinations. Physicians engaged in the Task
Force undertaking and those likely to be affected by it should
be aware of this. 5 For those engaged in the undertaking, the
statutory delegation of standard-setting power should encourage them to do their best to canvas the profession and
ensure a reasonable consensus.
Given that most courts are likely to accept the Task
Force criteria as the legal standard to be met in declaring pediatric brain death, one might ask whether the criteria apply
only to well-equipped tertiary care centers or to community
hospitals as well. The question arises because of the sophistication of various ancillary tests that may be used to diagnose
or confirm pediatric brain death. Contrast angiography, nuclear flow scanning, evoked potentials, ultrasound and doppler flow studies and electroencephalography all require
some equipment and expertise not found in many hospitals
outside major tertiary care centers. As a practical matter,
therefore, the criteria cannot be used at hospitals without this
equipment or expertise in those special cases where the criteria would require or indicate their use. In such an instance, it
may be necessary to transfer the patient to an appropriate
major medical facility in order to comply with the criteria
and reach a confident pediatric brain death conclusion. On
.33.
34.

Id.
VA. CODE

§ 54-325.7 (1979).

35. Indeed, we should all bear this in mind for what has been statutorily delegated to physicians is more than the power to set mere abstract
technical standards. It is, rather, the power to set technical standards which
have important moral content and consequences. The public should be
aware of the moral bases of whatever standards are set and debate them
for the proper decisionmaker, ultimately, on what circumstances justify a
declaration of death is the body politic, not doctors, lawyers or judges. See
T. Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J. LAW & MED. 393
(1982).
36. In this regard, it is important to note that the Task Force, states
explicitly that the criteria outlined "are the most rigorous in order to avoid
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the other hand, in some instances, it may be possible to diagnose brain death largely on the basis of clinical criteria and
without the aid of any especially sophisticated ancillary tests.
If so, it may be useful for the Task Force to consider addressing this problem specifically so that physicians without the sophisticated equipment or expertise required for certain ancillary tests may know with some specificity under what
circumstances they may satisfactorily reach a conclusion of
pediatric brain death using the Task Force criteria.
Another issue of some importance given the likely legal
effect of the criteria is the question surrounding their application with respect to infants under six months of age. Ancillary tests for such infants have not been validated. They may
be applicable, but only with caution." The Task Force may
wish to consider making more explicit how the criteria
should be used with respect to infants younger than six
months of age, including what kinds of ancillary testing
might be required in various cases.38 If, as seems clear, insufficient data exists with respect to the ancillary tests, studies
should be proposed or recommended to determine which of
the ancillary tests are most reliable for these infants and what
the clinical criteria should be for these infants if they are different from the criteria for older children.
CONCLUSION

Determining brain death in very young children is as
knotty a problem as it is an important one. We are all indebted to the Task Force members for their effort in this regard. We owe them our support and our careful and thoughtful criticism of their work as it progresses to a final draft. At
the same time, lawyers would do well to consider some legal
issues that may arise in connection with these criteria, includincorrectly diagnosing brain death." Task Force, supra note 18, at 2. Given
the potential use of the Task Force criteria as a legal standard, it might be
more appropriate to note that the criteria are reasonably selected to avoid
incorrect diagnoses rather than the "most rigorous."
37. See Ashwal & Schneider, supra note 22; Task Force, supra note
18, at 3-6.
38. Worth noting in this regard is authority holding that health care
providers may owe a higher standard of care to children than to adults. See,
e.g., Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446 (D. S.C. 1968) (eleven-yearold child owed higher duty of care by hospital than is an adult); Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732 (D. S.C. 1966) (premature infant is
entitled to highest degree of care owing to its helplessness and precarious
hold on life).
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ing whether a physician must consult with a family member
before ordering the termination of life support activities with
respect to an infant who is brain dead under the criteria and
hence under an applicable statute. Surely prudence and sensitivity dictate that the family be consulted, but circumstances
may not always permit this to occur and there is, of course,
always the possibility that the family may wish to continue life
support activities even though the patient is brain dead.
There may be certain circumstances in which the family does
not accept the brain death diagnosis and requests additional
ancillary tests. In this instance, physicians need to know
whether they are legally (as well as ethically) bound to perform these tests even though they are not medically indicated. In this area as in others, advances in medical science
challenge doctors and lawyers to join together in solving difficult medical, moral and legal questions.

